The Sources of Practical Reasons
To Claim:
There are substantive criteria for the rationality of intrinsic desires. Therefore, instrumentalism is false.
[Intrinsic desires]:
Wanting something for its olvn sake.
There is some such characteristic or some intrinsic quality for which we want it.
We not only have a conception of the thing wanted, but also a sense of some apparently intrinsic characteristic of the activity or state of affairs in question. e.g. wantin-g to have a cool swim on a hot day (1) Pleasure as an object of intrinsic desire =+ Hedonism Wanting something for pleasure is wanting it for (presumed) intrinsic qualities of it that make it attractive to one as pleasure; it is not wanting it as a causal or other contingent producer of pleasure.
(2) The cession of pain as the object of intrinsic desire
The cessation of pain is not wanted as a means to elimination of the unpleasant qualities. Its cessation itself is the object of our want.
$ Ill-grounded Intrinsic Desires Q: Lre there ill-grounded intrinsic desires versus Audi:
It can be foolish to think that certain things Unjustified beliefs or presuppositions are among render intrinsic desires ill-grounded.
Q: What sort of things would you consider to be intrinsic desires?
well-grounded ones? are enjoyable. the major factors that ill -grounded/irration al
$ Objects of Rational Desires
There is a sense in which the apparently rational desires so far examined are self-interested. This is not to say that they are selfish. That would be a matter of how they are related to other people. But they are intuitively of the kind which it is in one's own interest to satisfy.
x To see the difference between the merely self-interested and the egoistic, take a self-interested desire that is more likely to seem egoistic, in the sense of being directed toward one's own well-beirg, not just toward something one ceres about.
* three kinds of desires:
(1) objectual wanting -directed to a thing, including an action or experience or property, that one is aware of. (2) Behavioral wanting -directed to one's own action, as in the case of wanting to swim. (3) Propositional wanting -directed to a state of affairs expressed subjunctively, as where one wants that there be no more'war...
* Certain features of intrinsic desires:
1. The grounds of a desire do not enter into its content and need v not enter into the content of any other, such as a desire for a further end, just as the basis of a belief-does not enter into its content and need not enter into that of any other belief, such as one expressin-g a premise for the first. 2. It is not clear that simply wantin_e the pain to stop for its felt unpleasantness requires conceptualizing it at all. 3. A self-concept need not enter into desire regarding oneself. If some indexiCal notion is part of the conteniof my want, we should construe that content referentially, not conceptually. 4. Desires can be self-interested without being egoistic.
$ Hedonism and Rational Desire
To say that something is pleasurable (or, for that matter, intrinsically good) is not equivalent to saying that it is always rational, on balance, to want it for its own sake.
The notion of intrinsic goodness is highly practical.
I am inclined to -aglee with hedonism that pleasure is intrinsically good 1nd pain intrinsically bad; but I do not hold that these are the oirty intrinsic values.
I want to develop a theory of value, and of reasons for action, that is more pluralistic.
e.g.
(1) self-improvement (the perceptible sense of improvement in the quality of something we are doing.) (2) intrinsic intellectual challenge that may be unenjoyable or even unpleasant (3) activities that engaging way
Conclusion:
Hedonism is too narrow as an account of the grounds of rational desire. Pleasure need not be the only intrinsic good. I reject the two-dimensional model of motivation so natural for hedonism: the idea that all motivation resides either directly in hedonic desire or in desire instrumentally based on it. Pleasure is perhaps the most primitive and enduring kind of reward in human life, but this does not entail that we seek all other goods for the pleasure of their realization, nor does pleasure in contemplating the realization of a good entail that one seeks it "fo, pleasure.
$ Axiological Experientialism
The view that only experiences have intrinsic value.
Audi: -My lheory of rationality allows, but does not require, that there be things of intrinsic value other than experiences ancl itreir qualities. If there are, however, surely the awareness of their value is acquirecl at least in part througft experience.
If there are non-experiential intrinsic goocls, they provide us with noninstrunrental reasons for action. But we still need-experience of them or something relevantly similar if they are to provide us with basic reasons for action.
f encounter these qualities in my own experience, but the rationality of wanting thingsfor those qualities is grounded in the qualities themselves, not on these qualities conceived as experienced by me. employ some of our more complex faculties in an and hence are ttrewardingtt It is true that the experiential grounds of practical rationality are internal; but they are not egocentric. They are communicable to others and repeatable in their experience.
Q: Has Audi successfully separated his experientialism from egoism?
$ Practical Skepticism
The rationality conferred upon intrinsic desires is subjective and entirely relative. Nothing is beyond intrinsic desire if one is attracted to it; and what is rational for one of us, ffi?y be irrational for another.
Audi:
The experiential status and internal accessibility of these grounds should not be taken to imply either that there are no objective standards of rationality or that the only intrinsic goods are experiences or their properties.
Even if everything intrinsically good can be an object of experience, it does not follow that it is simply an element in experience or a property thereof. Assuming it is such an element, however, there can be kinds of experiences, such as those that are enjoyable, which are good from an impersonal point of view.
These experiences' realization will depend on the subjects who have them; but their status as intrinsically good, and as providing impersonal grounds for rational intrinsic desires, is not subjective. It is intersubjectively ascertainable, apparently universal, and objective.
There are general standards of rationality, including the widely held standard of pleasure and pain as generating good prima facie reasons both for action and for desire. Q: Do you agree with Audi that there are "intersubjectively ascertainable, universal and objective" grounds for the rationality of intrinsic desires?
Chapter 5 Desires, Intentions, and Reasons for Action Main Thesis:
Desire without belief has no direction. If desire can express wellgrounded reasons for action, it does not play its motivationally basic role entirely alone. Beliefs are also essential in this role. Without them, even if there could be rational desires as foundations for practical reason, there would be no adequate means of building a superstructure.
$ Desire and Intention 1. Desire is not the fundamental practical attitude -many desires may be "directionless" and a desire need not eyen be to do something. 2. Intention, on the other hand, has the executive character. There is a kind of motivational comrnitment to what we intend. 3. There may be incompatible objects of desire; there can't be incompatible objects of intention.
In a very wide sense, our beliefs indicate the content of our intellect; our map of the world -at least of our world. In a similar wfly, our intentions indicate the content of our wills: our overall plans to change the world.
$ Rational Desire and Reasons for Action
It appears that the possibility of one's forming a belief about how to realize a desire is a condition for that desire's providing one with a reason for action, that is, providing what we might call a nortnative direction for desire, roughly a direction in which it ought to take place.
$ The Authority of the Theoretical over the Practical
Whereas the rationality of intrinsic desire is defeasible by betiefs, that of beliefs is not defeasible by desire.
Whereas desires cannot render beliefs rational, beliefs can render desires rational.
* the indispensability of belief in instrumentally rational action: Belief plays a crucial role wherever the pattern is instrumental: so long as what I want is something other than to perform a basic action, there is no action that, in the light of that want, is rational for me apart from what I believe, since I must find a means to satisfying this want. =+ rational connectirtg belief There are cases in which a good reason we have for doing something is not in fact the reason for which we actually do it. But just as a belief is rational in the light of a reason for holding it only if held on the basis of that reason, fltr action is rational in the light of a reason for performing it, only if performed on the basis of that reason.
Beliefs can supply reasons with normative power (render intrinsic wants rational) only if they themselves are well grounded, and the needed grounds will be experiential.
$ Reasons for Action (l) norunative reasons -reasons (in the sense of objective grouncls)
there are to take a cool swim on a blistering day [e.g. On a hot day it is always good to go for a cool swim.l person-relative normative reasons -reasons for me to take a cool swim [e.g. On a hot day it is good for me to take a cool swim.] possess ed reasons -reasons I have to take a cool swim [e.g. I want to relax on a hot duy; therefore, I take a cool swim.] explanatory reasons -reasons why I take a cool swim motivating reasons -reasons fo, which I take a cool swim (2) We have intrinsic wants as a foundation of our motivational structure, and, contrary to instrumentalism, if we have any rational desire, it is in virtue of our having one or more rational intrinsic desires.
Our instrumental desires often have a quite integrated grounding, since so many of them are built upon important intrinsic desires.
Rational intrinsic desires ll rationality Action
The crucial element that links the rationality of action to that of a desire it subserves is the connecting belief, the belief to the effect that doing the deed will contribute to realizing that desire.
Well-groundedness of the action requires that at least one crucial connecting belief be rational.
sdefeasibility
There is defeat of the rationality of the foundational element, as where the rationality of the intrinsic want is undermined or overridden.
There is also defeat of the rationality of the connecting belief, as where one discovers that one was foolish to think an action would be sufficient for one's end.
Defeat of the foundational desire can come from beliefs, sfly, a belief that satisfy.ing the want will not be wortfuwhile, or from beiiefs together with wants, as where I discover that realizing the want will prevent satisfying one that is more important to me.
If one has a reason that is undefeated, then if it has sufficient strength relative to what it is a rg_ap_t fott it makes it rational to do somethfng one justified believes will fill the bill. This transmissiol principle o captures part of the important idea that an action supported tiy u sufficient reason is rational.
This principle does not imply that an action supported by a sufficient reason must be what one has best reason to do.-For one thing, we often have equally gogd reasons for different options, ntry of whicfiit is quite reasonable to take.
Audi's definition of rational action: Rational action is action that is at least minimally well-grounded: it must be based on some rational ground by some ratiotral iognitive connection.
Not all rational actions are intentional. Still, whenever any nonintentional action is rational, it is apparently by virtue of io-* intentional action that is. We mighl call suih non-intentional rational actions indirectly well'groundedz being wanted neither as ends nor as means' They are not motivationally grounded directly in any desire; 3"9 being rational on neither of those counts, their .itiotrality is also indirect.
Rationality is like justification in being transmissible to items other than its primary bearers.
* ttinternalismtt
The notion of rational action is internal in the sense that it requires that the agent c_a!, by reflecting with sufficient care, arrive at the relevant ground that a connection between it and the action it supports, even if not under description of these abstract kinds.
Even if there are external reasons to act, unless I have appropriate access to these reasons, they_ are not reasons fo, rne )nor can iti.y iender an action I perform rational unless they becbme so.
Qt PoJou agree with Audi's internalism with respect to rational action? [Conclusion] : the autonomy of practical reason Theoretical reason takes us from rational grounds for action to the rationality of actions supported by those grounds. Such actions constitute a practical analogue of rational inferential belief, and there are also analogous transmission principles linking the rational in intrinsic desires to that of desires or actions based on them.
But theoretical reason does not by itself supply all of the basic grounds of action.
The beliefs about action that provide reasons for it can do so only if they are themselves well-grounded; and the kinds of grounds they require for this task include experiences that are themselves more basic sources of practical reasons than belief s themselves.
In fundamental cases of practical reason, the formation of intrinsic desires, like the formation of non-inferential beliefs, is a discriminative response to experience,, whether sensory or introspective or reflective or some other kind. There are features of experience that play basic normative roles in both the practical and theoretical spheres.
Action is discriminative response to desires and belief that arise in our experience -and is thereby also a response to reasons for it. These conative and cognitive elements are rational when they are well-grounded.
Well-groundedness is experiential for intrinsic desire, as it is for our normal non-inferential beliefs; it is inferential in the case of instrumental desires and inferential beliefs, and it is also inferential -in the practical sense -in the case of actions. Q: What is Audi's experientialisrn? What does he place such an importance on the role of experiences in both non-inferential beliefs and intrinsic desires? Does this mean that we cannot have any intrinsic desire without experiences? Action fr Instrumental desire flSerll*t-slnlcf r.lrul fl {:{tr*t{cting h*{iqf's Intrinsic desires ---intrinsic desir€ ... Intrinsic desire I l,'*erlrcflll€ic*s tr exp:*ri*nces
